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NOTES AND COMMENTS
since the last-named rule was sufficient to support the holding in
Metsker v. Whitsell, supra, the case could be distinguished. The fact
that the court rather arbitrarily decided that the former ground
rather than the latter was dicta indicates the fineness of the distinc-
tion. Moreover, it indicates a disposition by the court to shift from
a conceptual application of the rule to a realistic one.
If the court had literally applied the Indiana rule that an act
which amends a non-existent statute is invalid, it would have placed
itself in the absurd position of holding that a statute which is validly
passed and approved but which is not formally published and proclaimed
until eight days after the original act expires is totally ineffective.
The root of the difficulty is the Indiana rule, which is a minority
position. The decisions of the federal courts on this point have con-
sistently been contra. Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyce, 104 Fed. 172
(C.C.A. 7th, 1900); see City of Beatrice v. Masslich, 108 Fed. 743, 746
(C.C.A. 8th, 1901). Although the decisions in the state courts are in
conflict, the definite weight of authority opposes the Indiana rule.
Fenolio v. Sebastian Bridge Dist., 133 Ark. 380, 200 S.W. 501 (1917);
Attorney General ex rel. Burbank v. Stryker, 141 Mich. 437, 104 N.W.
737 (1905). The majority rule applies to statutes that have been
declared unconstitutional as well as to those that have been repealed.
JONES, STATUTE LAW MAKING (1923) 185.
TORTS
STATUTORY VIOLATION LABELED NEGLIGENCE PER SE
The Arkansas State Highway Commission, pursuant to its author-
ity to regulate load limits, filed suit to recover damages sustained
when defendant's overloaded truck caused a bridge to collapse. The
trial court submitted the issue of negligence to the jury which found
for the defendant, although the statute expressly declared that any
violator should be held civilly liable for damage. On appeal, held:
reversed. The defendant's violation of the regulation constituted neg-
ligence per se. Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Mode, 157 S.W.
(2d) 53 (Ark. 1942).
A majority of jurisdictions deem violations of traffic statutes
to be negligence per se. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814
(1920); Winder & Son v. Blaine, 29 N.E. (2d) 987 (Ind. 1940);
cf. Note (1918) 28 YALE L.J. 91. Arkansas and a few other states,
however, have held such violations to be mere evidence of negligence.
Shipp v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., 197 Ark. 104, 122 S.W. (2d)
593 (1939); Hansen v. Kemmish, 210 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926);
Note (1930) 10 B.U.L. REV. 211, 219. Here the court decided that a
clause in the statute expressly imposing civil liability upon violators
has the effect of making breaches ordinarily accepted only as evidence
of negligence, into negligence per se.
The court should have ruled for the plaintiff without any reli-
ance upon common law doctrines of negligence. Cf. Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action (1913) 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319-328 with
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16
19421
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MINN. L. REV. 361 passim and Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 712, 716.
Common law negligence is irrelevant where liability is statutory. Here
liability was squarely placed by the statute upon violators of the
commission's ruling, and the court's failure to act directly under it
resulted only in needless confusion. The Arkansas legislature should
be commended for expressly setting forth its intent as to civil liability.
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 6809(a).' Such statutes would go a long
way toward clarifying and settling the law in situations where con-
fusion has resulted from the common law's clumsy attempt to keep
pace with modern developments. It is regrettable that such statutes
are rare, and it is even more regrettable when courts fail to take
advantage of them when they exist.
TRADE REGULATION
"COLA" NOT ENJOINED AS MARK OR NAME
An injunction prohibiting appellant Dixi-Cola Laboratories from
using the word "Cola" was dissolved. "Cola," used either alone or as a
suffix, is generic and descriptive and can be used only if confusion
is avoided.'
Claiming its mark2 is infringed, plaintiff here seeks to enjoin the
1Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 352 (C.C.A.
4th, 1941), cert. denied, 62 S. Ct. 60 (1941).
2 The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1938) §§ 715, 716, refers to marks as
arbitrary words adopted as technical marks and names as de-
scriptive words which have acquired a "secondary meaning." Equity
early protected marks as property, which concept it gradually ex-
panded. See Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Rep.
956 (1838). The first user of an arbitrary and fanciful (non-
descriptive and unfamiliar) word is protected in its use as a tech-
nical mark. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS (3d ed.
1929) § 51. But cf. In re Richfield Oil Co., 88 F. (2d) 499
(C.C.P.A. 1937). Analogous protection is given descriptive words
which have acquired a "secondary meaning," i.e., when their pri-
mary sense in the market refers to a particular product. RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 716, comment b; NIMS, supra § 37;
Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 YALE L.S.
1, 9. The basis of this protection is tort, though the courts have
little difficulty in discovering wrongful intent. See Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); Elgin National
Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901);
Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 55 Ind. App. 455, 464,
104 N.E. 34, 37 (1914); DERENBERG, TRADE MARK PROTECTION AND
UNFAIR TRADING '(1936) § 30; Grismore, Fraudulent Intent in Trade-
Mark Cases (1929) 27 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858.
By making a registrant of a descriptive name the prima fasie
owner, the ten-year proviso of the Act of 1905 conferred a pre-
sumption of a property right sufficient to gain equitable juris-
diction. 33 STAT. 728 (1905), U.S.C.X. 96 (1934); Charles Broad-
way Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 Fed. 706, 712 (C.C.A. 2d,
1924); see Liddy, Has Congress the Constitutional Power to Leg-
islate on the Substantive Law of Trade Marks? (1937) 6 FORDHA1
L. REV. 408, 412; cf. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233
U.S. 461, 470, 471 (1914); see also United States Printing &
Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156 (1929);
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